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Abstract—The Internet of Thing (IoT) has been a hot topic
in both research community and industry. It is anticipated that
in future IoT, an enormous number of sensors will collect the
physical information every moment to enable the control center
making better decisions to improve the quality of service (QoS).
However, the sensors maybe faulty and thus generate inaccurate
data which would compromise the decision making. To guarantee
the QoS, the system should be able to detect faulty sensors so
as to eliminate the damages of inaccurate data. Various faulty
sensor detection mechanisms have been developed in the context
of wireless sensor network (WSN). Some of them are only fit for
WSN while the others would bring a communication burden to
control center. To detect the faulty sensors for general IoT appli-
cations and save the communication resource at the same time, an
efficient faulty sensor detection scheme is proposed in this paper.
The proposed scheme takes advantage of fog computing to save
the computation and communication resource of control center.
To preserve the privacy of sensor data, the Paillier Cryptosystem
is adopted in the fog computing. The batch verification technique
is applied to achieve efficient authentication. The performance
analyses are presented to demonstrate that the proposed detection
scheme is able to conserve the communication resource of control
center and achieve a high true positive ratio while maintaining an
acceptable false positive ratio. The scheme could also withstand
various security attacks and preserve data privacy.
Index Terms—faulty sensor detection, fog computing, privacy-
preserving, security, Internet of Thing.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the prosperous developing of communicationand computation technologies, the Internet of Things,
which allows the physical objects to be accessed and con-
trolled remotely through the network infrastructure and thus
more tightly integrates the physical world and cyber world,
is no longer a fancy nowadays. The big advantage of IoT is
that with the data analysis on the huge amount of information
collected from the physical world, the control center is capable
of making more accurate and optimal decisions which would
produce considerable benefits. It is estimated that the global
IoT market will be 14.4 trillion dollars by 2022 [1], the
potential economic impact of IoT would be 3.9 to 11.1 trillion
dollars by 2025 [2], and the number of devices connected to
the Internet would be about 50 billion by 2020 [3]. Since
the control center makes decisions based on the data analysis,
the requirement of data accuracy should be high. However, in
reality, the data analysis could suffer from the interferences
caused by some physical factors. Specifically, the sensors
collecting physical information maybe faulty due to device
aging, battery depletion or some unexpected environmental
influences, which could result in inaccurate data. There are
several sensor fault types defined in [4]. In this paper, the
sensor fault type we focus on is high noise or variance which
may be caused by hardware failure or low batteries [4]. For
this type of faulty sensor, its readings will have deviations from
actual physical data due to unusually high amount of noise.
Denote the actual physical data at time t as data(t) and sensor
reading at time t as data∗(t). A smart sensor is defined as
faulty sensor if data∗(t) = data(t) · (1+δ) where δ is a random
variable with normal distribution N(0, α2) and the deviation
measurement α2 is larger than the inherent white noise of
sensor. The sensing data with high amount of noise would not
only waste the computation and communication resource but
also compromise the data analysis result of control center. It
is impractical to check the physical condition of all sensors
regularly because the amount of sensors is too large and many
sensors are deployed in the unattended or uncontrollable en-
vironment. In the state of the art, there are several approaches
for detecting the faulty sensors. Some of these methods are
based on majority voting, which compare the sensor’s data
with its neighbor sensors to determine whether the sensor is
normal [5], [6]. However, the state of the neighbor sensors
would affect the detection accuracy, i.e. if the majority of the
neighbors are faulty, a normal sensor would be recognized
as faulty. Moreover, the size of neighbour sensor set also
affect the detection effectiveness. Those methods require that
there are several sensors performing the same task, which
is suitable for WSN while maybe infeasible for other IoT
applications. Thus, these kinds of methods are inadequate
for the general IoT scenarios. The other kinds of detection
schemes use control center to analyse the time series sensor
data by bayesian belief network, machine learning, wavelet
analysis, principal component analysis, etc [7]–[10]. Due to
the huge amount of sensors, the data transmission from sensors
to control center would consume considerable communication
resource and may lead to network delay.
To decrease the sensor data volume transmitted to control
center for ensuring the network quality of service, a new tech-
nique called fog computing, which is proposed by Cisco [11],
is suitable to be applied. The main idea of fog computing is to
provide storage, computing and networking services between
end devices and control center. The fog devices which are in
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2close proximity to end devices normally possess considerable
storage and computation resource. With the equipped resource,
the fog devices could process the collected data locally so as
to ease the burden of control center. The architecture of fog
computing is shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of Fog Computing
There are three tiers in the fog computing architecture:
environmental tier, edge tier and cloud tier. In the environ-
mental tier, there are billions of smart sensors collecting
heterogeneous information of physical world, e.g. medical
sensors in eHealth and smart meters in smart grid. The data
obtained by the smart sensors will be transmitted to the edge
tier. The distribution of fog devices in edge tier are hierarchical
which is a characteristic inherited from the traditional network
architecture. For example, the switchers of a local area network
could function as the first layer fog devices and the gateway
which manages those switchers could serve as the second layer
fog device. The fog devices in edge tier will perform the fog
processing to deal with the received sensor data locally and
then send the results to the control center in cloud tier. Owing
to the processing of fog devices, the volume of data sent to
control center could be reduced to a large extent. Since the
fog devices are spread in a highly distributed environment, it
is impractical for the government or an institution to provide
and maintain all those devices. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the fog devices would be supplied by third parties.
Under the context of fog computing, one could migrate
the abovementioned time series data analysis from control
center to fog devices for faulty sensor detection, i.e. the
fog devices analyse the received data with the traditional
methods and report the detection result to control center.
However, in many IoT applications, the data collected from
the environment would be considered as privacy by the data
owners, e.g. the vital signs in eHealth and the power usage
in smart grid. Performing the traditional analysis with fog
devices is infeasible if the privacy is a primary concern from
the perspective of data owners because what the traditional
methods analyse are plaintexts and the third parties which
control the fog devices may not be trustworthy. Therefore,
how to take advantage of fog computing to locally detect faulty
sensors in a privacy-preserving way is a challenging issue.
In this paper, we propose an efficient fog-assisted faulty
sensor detection scheme with privacy-preserving, which could
identify the faulty sensors locally so as to save the communi-
cation resource of control center. Since the sensor fault type
this paper focuses on is high noise or variance, inspired by
[12], the scatter matrix is adopted to measure the degree of
sensor data deviation. The homomorphic encryption technique
called Paillier encryption [13] is applied to ensure the fog de-
vices compute the scatter matrix in a privacy-preserving way.
Utilizing the scatter matrix, the fog devices could calculate the
dispersion measure and then identify the faulty sensors. The
main contributions of this paper are three-fold.
• First, to identify faulty sensors, we propose an efficient
fog-assisted privacy-preserving detection scheme. Since
the detection procedures are performed in the fog devices,
it could reduce the communication resource consumption
of control center significantly. Moreover, for each sensor,
even its data is multidimensional, the corresponding pro-
cessed data transmitted from the first layer fog device to
the second layer fog device would still be a single Paillier
ciphertext. The scatter matrix could be derived from the
ciphertext efficiently by the second layer fog device. The
feature could conserve the local network resource.
• Second, the proposed scheme utilizes Paillier Cryptosys-
tem to preserve the data privacy. Each data sample is
encrypted as a Paillier ciphertext before being sent to fog
devices. Utilizing the feature of Paillier Cryptosystem, the
first layer fog device could perform algebraic operations
on sensor data in the encrypted form, which would not
leak the sensor data content. The second layer fog device
could only obtain the aggregated data from the first layer
fog device to compute the scatter matrix. Thus, the sensor
data privacy could be preserved during the fog processing.
• Third, our scheme achieves the data confidentiality, au-
thenticity and integrity. With the application of Paillier
Cryptosystem and Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) short sig-
nature technique [14], the messages exchanged among
the environmental tier, edge tier and cloud tier could
withstand the eavesdropping attack, replay attack and
man-in-the-middle attack.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow. In Section
II, the system model, security requirements and design goals
are described. The preliminaries of our scheme are introduced
in Section III. In Section IV, the proposed detection scheme
is presented in details. The security analysis and performance
evaluation are discussed in Section V and VI, respectively. In
Section VII, the related work discussion is presented. Finally,
our work is concluded in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND
DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we describe the system model, formalize the
security requirement and identify the design goals on privacy-
preserving faulty sensor detection.
A. System Model
In this work, we mainly focus on how to utilize the fog
computing to detect faulty sensor locally and with privacy-
preserving. Specifically, there are four entities in the system
3model, namely a control center, a first layer fog device, a
second layer fog device and a smart sensor to be detected as
shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. System Model
Control Center (CC): CC is a fully trustable entity locating
in the cloud tier. It is responsible for initializing the whole
system and distributing key materials to others.
First Layer Fog Device (FD): FD is the fog device which
communicates with the smart sensor directly. FD receives
and processes the data from smart sensor, and uploads the
processed data to the second layer fog device. FD is assumed
to possess a considerable amount of computation and storage
resource which could be used to do cryptography and data
aggregation operations.
Second Layer Fog Device (SD): SD is the fog device which
communicates with FD. Upon receiving the data from FD, SD
would perform further processing on the data for the purpose
of detecting faulty sensor. Similar to FD, SD is assumed to be
capable of performing cryptography operations.
Smart Sensor (SS): SS collects environmental information
which is formed as multidimensional data periodically. The
fog devices determine whether SS is faulty through analysing
the data uploaded by SS. SS is assumed to have little storage
and could only do cryptography operations.
In our model, CC first initializes the whole system and
distributes the key materials to other entities accordingly. After
initialization, SS keeps sensing the physical information. Each
time SS collects a physical data sample, it will encrypt and
sign it, and send the sample to FD. FD stores the received
samples for a certain period of time. When the number of
received samples meets the preset value, FD would carry out
its processing procedures to aggregate the data samples into a
single Paillier ciphertext which contains the full information
needed to compute the scatter matrix. Upon receiving the ag-
gregated data from FD, SD will decrypt the Paillier ciphertext
and further compute the scatter matrix and dispersion measure.
Comparing the dispersion measure with a certain threshold,
SD could determine whether SS is faulty. Then, SD reports
the detection result to CC. Finally, if SS is recognized as
faulty, CC could advise the system manager to check the
condition of SS manually and fix/replace SS if necessary. This
could improve the quality of service which is of paramount
importance for IoT.
Communication model. Considering the scope of local re-
gion, WiFi technology is utilized to achieve the communica-
tion among SS, FD and SD. For the communication between
SD and CC, the channel is composed of wired/wireless links
with high bandwidth due to the long distance. Note that
although with high bandwidth channel, the communication
efficiency between cloud tier and edge tier is still a challenging
issue if the enormous amount of sensor data from environmen-
tal tier is relayed to CC directly.
B. Security Requirements
Security is fundamental for the effectiveness of faulty sensor
detection. In our security model, CC and SS are assumed to
be trustable. The hierarchical fog devices, i.e. FD and SD,
are assumed to be honest-but-curious which means they will
follow the processing procedures faithfully while being curious
about the sensor data contained in the messages. In addition,
FD and SD are assumed not to collude with each other.
Besides the four entities in the system model, there exists an
adversary A whose capabilities are assumed as: 1) A could
eavesdrop the messages exchanged among the cloud tier, edge
tier and environmental tier. 2) A could replay and modify the
eavesdropped messages to launch some active attacks. Based
on the above assumptions, we have the following security
requirements:
• Confidentiality. The sensor data should not be disclosed
to fog devices and adversary A. Specifically, for FD and
SD, even they process the collected data, they could not
learn anything about the situation of monitored object; for
the adversary A, even it could eavesdrop the messages
exchanged among legitimate entities, it could not gain
any knowledge of monitored object.
• Authenticity and Integrity. The messages transmitted in
the system should be authenticated to ensure they are
generated by legal entities and have not been altered. This
is to protect the system from the active attacks launched
by the adversary A. Any malicious actions from the
adversary A should be detected.
C. Design Goals
According to the aforementioned system model and security
requirements, the design goal is to develop an efficient privacy-
preserving faulty sensor detection scheme with the assistance
of fog computing. Specifically, the proposed scheme should
achieve the following objectives.
• The faulty sensors should be identified with the proposed
detection scheme. Since the faulty data would waste the
system resource and influence the decision making of CC,
the proposed scheme should achieve a high true positive
ratio and maintain a relatively low false positive ratio.
• The communication resource should be conserved in
the proposed scheme. The communication effectiveness
between cloud tier and edge tier could be affected if all
4the sensor data is transmitted to CC for analysis. The
proposed scheme should manage to reduce the overall
data volume sent to CC.
• The confidentiality, authenticity and data integrity should
be guaranteed in the proposed scheme. All the messages
containing the information of monitored object need to be
protected in case of eavesdropping and modifying. The
fog processing in FD and SD should not leak the privacy
of monitored object.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the Paillier Cryptosystem [13], bilinear
pairing technique [15] and scatter matrix [12] which are the
basis of the proposed scheme are reviewed.
A. Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier Cryptosystem enables the addition and multipli-
cation operations on plaintext through the specific linear alge-
braic manipulation conducted on the ciphertext. This property
is extensively desired in many privacy-preserving applications
[16]–[18]. In this paper, this feature allows FD to process
the sensor data in encrypted form without leaking the data
content. The Paillier Cryptosystem comprises three phases:
key generation, encryption and decryption.
• Key Generation: Given one security parameter κ,generate
two large prime numbers p, q, where |p| = |q | = κ. Then
compute the RSA modulus n = pq, λ = lcm(p − 1, q −
1) and choose a generator g ∈ Z∗
n2
. Define the function
L(u) = u−1n and calculate µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n.
Then PK = (n, g) is published as the public key and SK
= (λ, µ) is kept secret as the corresponding private key.
• Encryption: Given a message m ∈ Zn, randomly choose
a number r ∈ Z∗n, the ciphertext could be calculated as
c = E(m, r) = gm · rn mod n2.
• Decryption: Given the ciphertext c ∈ Z∗
n2
, the correspond-
ing plaintext could be recovered as m = D(c) = L(cλ mod
n2) · µ mod n. Note that, the Paillier Cryptosystem is
provably secure against chosen plaintext attack, and the
correctness and security can be referred to [13].
B. Scatter Matrix
The scatter matrix is used to evaluate the data set diver-
gence. It is widely applied in pattern classification [19] [20],
feature selection [21] and principal component analysis [22]
for multiple areas, e.g. data mining and computer vision. Given
N samples of l-dimensional data, represented as the l-by-N
matrix, X = [®x1, ®x2, · · · , ®xN ], the data mean is
x =
1
N
N∑
i=1
®xi (1)
where ®xi is the ith column of X. The scatter matrix M is an
l-by-l positive semi-definite matrix computed as
M =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(®xi − x)(®xi − x)T (2)
where T denotes matrix transpose. As mentioned in [12],
obtaining the scatter matrix, one could find its eigenvalues
through decomposing the scatter matrix into a diagonal matrix.
M = Pdiag(λ1, · · · , λl)P−1 (3)
The ith eigenvalue λi measures the variance of the ith data
dimension. The dispersion measure is defined as the mul-
tiplication of nonzero eigenvalues, and a smaller dispersion
measure value indicates a more concentrated set. In this paper,
we utilize this feature to detect faulty sensors. In specific, for
each sensor, we collect N data samples from it in a certain
period of time, and compute the scatter matrix and dispersion
measure accordingly. Since the samples are from the same
sensor, the data values of the same dimension should be highly
correlated. If the sensor is normal, the variance of collected
data samples should be relatively small which leads to a small
dispersion measure. In other words, if the dispersion measure
is larger than a certain threshold, it means the sensor is under
faulty state. Note that the physical data used for detection
purpose should be collected when the condition of monitored
object is steady since what the scatter matrix measures is
the dispersion degree of data set. If the data generated by
the monitored object is originally unsteady, the variance of
data set would be inevitably larger than normal, and a normal
sensor maybe falsely recognized as faulty. For simplicity, we
assume the monitored object is under steady condition when
the detection scheme is being carried out.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, the proposed efficient fog-assisted faulty
sensor detection scheme with privacy-preserving is presented
in details. The scheme is composed of four phases: system
initialization, sensor data collection, fog aggregation and fog
analysis.
A. System Initialization
CC is the trustable entity which bootstraps the whole sys-
tem. Specifically, given the security parameters κ, CC calcu-
lates the public key for Paillier Cryptosystem PK: (n = pq, g),
and the corresponding private key SK: (λ, µ), where p, q are
two large primes with |p| = |q | = κ. Also, given the security
parameters κ1, CC runs Gen(κ1) to generate (q1, P,G,GT , e)
for bilinear pairing. Set the required number of data samples
for analysis as N . Assume the sensor data is l-dimensional
and the value range for each data dimension is [0, d] even if
the sensor is faulty, where d is a constant. Then, CC chooses
two superincreasing sequence ®a = (a1 = 1, a2, · · · , al) and®b = (b1 = 1, b2, · · · , bN ) such that ∑i−1j=1 bj · 2 · N · d < bi for
i = 2, · · · , N , ∑i−1j=1 aj ·∑Nk=1 bk · 2 · N · d < ai for i = 2, · · · , l
and
∑l
i=1 ai ·
∑N
k=1 bk · 2 · N · d < n. Also, CC chooses one
secure cryptographic hash function H where H : {0, 1}∗ → G.
For SD, FD and SS, CC randomly chooses numbers xs , x f
and xu ∈ Z∗q1 and computes Ys = xsP, Yf = x f P and Yu = xuP
respectively. Finally, CC publishes the public parameters as
{q1, P,G,GT , e, n, g,Ys,Yf ,Yu,H, ®a, ®b}, sends the (λ, µ, xs) to
SD as secret, and distributes the secrets x f and xu to FD and
SS respectively.
5B. Sensor Data Collection
In environmental tier, SS keeps monitoring the physical situ-
ation and reporting the l-dimensional data sample (d1, · · · , dl)T
frequently. For the ith data sample (d1i, · · · , dli)T , SS performs
the following steps:
• Step-1. Utilize the superincreasing ®a to compute
mi = a1d1i + a2d2i + · · · + aldli (4)
• Step-2. Choose a random number ri ∈ Z∗n and compute
Ci = gmi · rni mod n2 (5)
• Step-3. Use the private key xu to compute the signature
σi as
σi = xuH(Ci | |SS | |TSi) (6)
where TSi is the current time stamp.
• Step-4. Send the encrypted and signed ith data sample
Ci | |SS | |TSi | |σi to FD.
C. Fog Aggregation
When receiving a data sample, FD will check its time stamp
and store the sample if the time stamp is acceptable. Upon
receiving total N data samples from SS, FD first performs
batch verification to verify their signatures, i.e. check whether
e(P,∑Ni=1 σi) ?= ∏Ni=1 e(Yu,H(Ci | |SS | |TSi)). If the equation
does hold, it means the samples are valid. The correctness
is as follow.
e(P,
N∑
i=1
σi) = e(P,
N∑
i=1
xuH(Ci | |SS | |TSi))
=
N∏
i=1
e(P, xuH(Ci | |SS | |TSi))
=
N∏
i=1
e(Yu,H(Ci | |SS | |TSi))
(7)
After the validity checking, FD performs the following
privacy-preserving steps to aggregate the N data samples from
SS.
• Step-1. Aggregate the N encrypted samples as
C =
N∏
i=1
Ci mod n2
=
N∏
i=1
gmi · rni mod n2
= g
∑N
i=1 mi ·
N∏
i=1
rni mod n
2
= ga1
∑N
i=1 d1i+· · ·+al
∑N
i=1 dli ·
N∏
i=1
rni mod n
2
(8)
• Step-2. Calculate Ca = g
∑l
i=1 ai ·d mod n2. For each Ci, i =
1, · · · , N , perform
CDi =
(Ci · Ca)N
C
mod n2
=
(ga1d1i+· · ·+aldli+∑li=1 ai ·d · rni mod n2)N
C
mod n2
= ga1 ·[N (d1i+d)−
∑N
k=1 d1k ]+· · ·+al ·[N (dli+d)−
∑N
k=1 dlk ] · rndi
mod n2
= g
∑l
j=1 a j ·[N (d j i+d)−
∑N
k=1 d jk ] · rndi mod n2
(9)
where rdi = rNi · (
∏N
k=1 rk)−1 mod n2. Note that multiply-
ing Ca with Ci is to make N(dji + d) −∑Nk=1 djk > 0, for
j = 1, · · · , l. This ensures that SD could utilize the su-
perincreasing sequence to recover the information needed
for computing scatter matrix. The detailed explanation is
presented in the correctness of Algorithm 1 below.
• Step-3. Aggregate all the CDi, i = 1, · · · , N , as
Rf =
N∏
i=1
CDbii mod n
2 (10)
The Rf is the aggregation result of the data samples from
SS.
• Step-4. Use the private key x f to compute the signature
σf = x fH(Rf | |SS | |FD| |TSf ), where TSf is the current
time stamp.
• Step-5. Send the aggregation result Rf | |SS | |FD| |TSf | |σf
to SD.
D. Fog Analysis
Upon receiving Rf | |SS | |FD | |TSf | |σf , SD first checks
e(P, σf ) ?= e(Yf ,H(Rf | |SS | |FD| |TSf )) to verify the time stamp
and signature. Then SD will perform the following steps to
analyse the aggregation result Rf for SS and send report to
CC. The Rf is implicitly formed by
Rf =
N∏
i=1
CDbii mod n
2
=
N∏
i=1
gbi ·
∑l
j=1 a j ·[N (d j i+d)−
∑N
k=1 d jk ] · rnR mod n2
= g
∑N
i=1 bi ·
∑l
j=1 a j ·[N (d j i+d)−
∑N
k=1 d jk ] · rnR mod n2
= g
∑l
j=1 a j ·
∑N
i=1 bi ·[N (d j i+d)−
∑N
k=1 d jk ] · rnR mod n2
(11)
where rR =
∏N
i=1(rdi)bi .
• Step-1. Utilize the secret key (λ, µ) to decrypt the Rf
and get the plaintext of aggregation result
Mf =
l∑
j=1
aj ·
N∑
i=1
bi · [N(dji +d)−
N∑
k=1
djk] mod n (12)
• Step-2. Through running Algorithm 1, calculate the scat-
ter matrix from Mf .
• Step-3. Compute the dispersion measure of SS. Then
determine whether SS is a faulty sensor through com-
paring its dispersion measure with a preset threshold.
6Algorithm 1 Calculate the scatter matrix from aggregated data
1: procedure CALCULATE THE SCATTER MATRIX
Input: ®a = (a1 = 1, · · · , al ), ®b = (b1 = 1, · · · , bN ) and M f
Output:Scatter Matrix of SS
2: Let ®Tempa = (ta1, · · · , tal )T and Tempb = [ ®tb1, · · · , ®tbN ] where®tbi = (tb1i, · · · , tbli )T , i = 1, · · · , N .
3: Set Xl = M f
4: for j = l to 2 do
5: Xj−1 = Xj mod a j
6: ta j =
X j−X j−1
a j
=
∑N
i=1 bi · [N (d j i + d) −
∑N
k=1 d jk ]
7: end for
8: ta1 = X1 =
∑N
i=1 bi · [N (d1i + d) −
∑N
k=1 d1k ]
9: for j = 1 to l do
10: Set XN = ta j
11: for i = N to 2 do
12: Xi−1 = Xi mod bi
13: tb ji =
Xi−Xi−1
bi
N − d = d j i − 1N
∑N
k=1 d jk
14: end for
15: tb j1 =
X1
N − d = d j1 − 1N
∑N
k=1 d jk
16: end for
17: return 1N
∑N
i=1 ®tbi · ®tbi
T
18: end procedure
Let report be 1| |SS if SS is normal and 0| |SS other-
wise. Use the private key xs to compute the signature
σs = xsH(report | |SD | |TSs), where TSs is the current
time stamp.
• Step-4. Send the report report | |SD| |TSs | |σs to CC. Note
that if the report is considered as confidential, SD could
also encrypt it before sending it to CC.
The correctness of Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, Xl = Mf =
a1
∑N
i=1 bi ·[N(d1i+d)−
∑N
k=1 d1k]+· · ·+al−1
∑N
i=1 bi ·[N(d(l−1)i+
d) −∑Nk=1 d(l−1)k] + al ∑Ni=1 bi · [N(dli + d) −∑Nk=1 dlk] mod n.
Since the data value for each dimension is in the range of [0,
d], we have
a1
N∑
i=1
bi · [N(d1i + d) −
N∑
k=1
d1k] + · · ·
+ al−1
N∑
i=1
bi · [N(d(l−1)i + d) −
N∑
k=1
d(l−1)k]
<a1
N∑
i=1
bi · N · 2 · d + · · · + al−1
N∑
i=1
bi · N · 2 · d
=
l−1∑
j=1
aj
N∑
i=1
bi · N · 2 · d < al
(13)
Therefore, Xl−1 = Xl mod al = a1
∑N
i=1 bi · [N(d1i + d) −∑N
k=1 d1k] + · · · + al−1
∑N
i=1 bi · [N(d(l−1)i + d) −
∑N
k=1 d(l−1)k],
and
Xl − Xl−1
al
=
al
∑N
i=1 bi · [N(dli + d) −
∑N
k=1 dlk]
al
=
N∑
i=1
bi · [N(dli + d) −
N∑
k=1
dlk] = tal
(14)
Similarly, it can be proved that taj =
∑N
i=1 bi · [N(dji + d) −∑N
k=1 djk], for j = 1, · · · , l − 1. Obtaining taj , for j = 1, · · · , l,
we have XN = taj = b1 · [N(dj1 + d) −∑Nk=1 djk] + · · · + bN ·
[N(djN + d) −∑Nk=1 djk]. Since 0 ≤ dji ≤ d, for i = 1, · · · , N
and j = 1, · · · , l, there is
b1 · [N(dj1 + d) −
N∑
k=1
djk] + · · ·
+ bN−1 · [N(dj(N−1) + d) −
N∑
k=1
djk]
<b1 · N · 2 · d + · · · + bN−1 · N · 2 · d
=
N−1∑
i=1
bi · N · 2 · d < bN
(15)
Therefore, XN−1 = XN mod bN = b1 ·[N(dj1+d)−∑Nk=1 djk]+
· · · + bN−1 · [N(dj(N−1) + d) −∑Nk=1 djk], and
XN−XN−1
bN
N
− d = djN − 1N
N∑
k=1
djk = tbjN (16)
Similarly, it can be proved that tbji = dji − 1N
∑N
k=1 djk , for
i = 1, · · · , N − 1 and j = 1, · · · , l. Obtaining all the tbji , the
scatter matrix could be calculated as 1N
∑N
i=1 ®tbi · ®tbi
T . As a
result, the correctness of Algorithm 1 is shown.
Note that in the Step-2 of fog aggregation, Ca is used
to multiply Ci to guarantee N(dji + d) − ∑Nk=1 djk > 0,
for j = 1, · · · , l. If we did not multiply Ca with Ci , Mf
would become
∑l
j=1 aj ·
∑N
i=1 bi · [Ndji −
∑N
k=1 djk] mod n
and
∑N
i=1 bi · [Ndji −
∑N
k=1 djk] maybe negative. The neg-
ative
∑N
i=1 bi · [Ndji −
∑N
k=1 djk] could make the analysis
result wrong. For example, if dlN = 0 and dlk = d, for
k = 1, · · · , N − 1, then
N∑
i=1
bi · [Ndli −
N∑
k=1
dlk] =
N−1∑
i=1
bi · d + bN [−(N − 1)d]
< bN − bN [(N − 1)d] < 0
(17)
Assuming
∑N
i=1 bi · [Ndji −
∑N
k=1 djk] > 0 for j = 1, · · · , l −
1, then tal = 1al (Mf − Mf mod al) =
∑N
i=1 bi · [Ndli −∑N
k=1 dlk] mod n and tblN = 1N tal−tal mod bNbN . Due to the mod-
ular operation, tal would become n−∑Ni=1 bi ·[Ndli−∑Nk=1 dlk],
which is a positive number. This leads to tblN being positive
if tal ≥ bN , or 0 if tal < bN . However, the correct tblN should
be dlN − 1N
∑N
k=1 dlk which is negative. So it is necessary to
multiply Ca with Ci to ensure the information is correctly
recovered.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security properties of the proposed detec-
tion scheme are analysed. Specifically, the analysis focuses on
how the proposed scheme could achieve the aforementioned
security requirements in section II.
• Sensor data privacy is preserved in the proposed detec-
tion scheme. In the proposed scheme, each sensor data
sample (d1, · · · , dl)T is encrypted as g
∑l
j=1 a jd j ·rn mod n2,
which is a ciphertext of Paillier Cryptosystem. During fog
aggregation, what FD does is performing modular power,
division and multiplication operations on the collection of
7ciphertexts. When the fog aggregation result is decrypted
in SD, the plaintext is formed as M =
∑l
j=1 aj ·
∑N
i=1 bi ·
[N(dji + d) − ∑Nk=1 djk]. With the published ®a and ®b,
dji − 1N
∑N
k=1 djk, i = 1, · · · , N; j = 1, · · · , l could be
derived from M . Since Paillier Cryptosystem is semantic
secure against the chosen plaintext attack and only SD,
which does not collude with FD, possesses the secret
key (λ, µ), m = ∑lj=1 ajdj is semantic secure to FD
and the adversary A. Thus the confidentiality of sensor
data (d1, · · · , dl)T is guaranteed under fog aggregation
and eavesdropping. In addition, even SD recovers each
dji − 1N
∑N
k=1 djk , it could not learn anything about the
dji because it does not know the value of data mean
1
N
∑N
k=1 djk . Therefore, the proposed scheme could pre-
serve the data privacy.
• The authenticity and integrity of messages are achieved in
the proposed detection scheme. In the proposed scheme,
all transmitted messages are signed by the legal parties
with the BLS short signature technique [14]. The source
authenticity and message integrity could be guaranteed
because the BLS short signature is provably secure under
the CDH problem in random oracle model [23]. The time
stamp contained in the messages could prevent replay
attack. Any man-in-the-middle attack, e.g. alteration of
time stamp and message content, could be noticed since
the signature validity checking would fail. Therefore, our
proposed scheme is capable of detecting the malicious
activities from adversary A.
Based on the above analysis, it is obvious that our proposed
detection scheme achieves the privacy-preserving property
while guaranteeing the authenticity and integrity at the same
time, which fulfils the security requirements in section II.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
detection scheme in terms of capacity, effectiveness, compu-
tation complexity and communication overhead. Let l, d and
N denote the data dimension, maximum data value, required
number of data samples from SS for detection.
A. Capacity
In the proposed scheme, N data samples from SS are
aggregated as one Paillier ciphertext for detection. To guar-
antee the aggregated data Mf could be recovered correctly
from the ciphertext through decryption, the constraint
∑l
i=1 ai ·∑N
k=1 bk · 2 · N · d < n must be fulfilled. However, the su-
perincreasing sequence ®a and ®b also need to meet the con-
straints:
∑i−1
j=1 bj · 2 · N · d < bi for i = 2, · · · , N and∑i−1
j=1 aj ·
∑N
k=1 bk · 2 · N · d < ai for i = 2, · · · , l. As the value
of N , l and d increases, the value of the elements in ®a and
®b will grow very fast, which would cause it impossible to
meet the constraint
∑l
i=1 ai ·
∑N
k=1 bk · 2 · N · d < n. Therefore,
in this part, given different data dimension l and data range
[0, d], we evaluate the maximum number of data samples
could be aggregated into one Paillier ciphertext in the proposed
scheme. We implement the proposed detection scheme with
Java programming language and the evaluation result is shown
in Fig. 3.
From Fig. 3, it could be shown that the maximum number
of data samples FD could aggregate is very sensitive to the
data dimension while the impact of data value range is not
that significant. To collect more data samples for detection,
one could choose a larger ciphertext space.
B. Effectiveness
In this part, we utilize real physical data to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme in terms of true positive
ratio (TPR) and false positive ratio (FPR). Let Nuu denotes the
number of faulty data sets detected as faulty, Ntu denotes the
total number of faulty data sets, Nnu denotes the number of
normal data sets detected as faulty and Ntn denotes the total
number of normal data sets. The definition of TPR and FPR
are as follow.
TPR =
Nuu
Ntu
, FPR =
Nnu
Ntn
(18)
The real data is 2-dimensional ECG signal selected from the
MIT-BIH Arrhythmia Database [24], [25]. Specifically, the
data file we choose is the 100.dat file and there are 1300000
data samples inside. There are two phases in the evaluation
which are training phase and testing phase.
Training Phase In this phase, we select the first half of
data samples in the 100.dat file as the training samples and
utilize them to choose the proper thresholds to guarantee
the TPR is higher than 95% under different deviations of
data. Specifically, for a certain deviation, among the 650000
training samples, we randomly choose 10000 data sets as
training sets each of which contains 10 data samples from a
continuous time period, i.e. N = 10. Then we randomly choose
2000 data sets from the training sets to inject deviations, i.e.
Ntu = 2000 and Ntn = 8000. For each data sample [d1, d2]
from the selected 2000 data sets, the deviations are injected
as d∗1 = d1 + b(d1 · δ1)c and d∗2 = d2 + b(d2 · δ2)c where δ1 and
δ2 are random variables with normal distribution N(0, α2), the
value of α2 is the measurement of deviation and the bYc means
the largest integer less than or equal to Y . After the deviations
are injected, the scatter matrix and dispersion measure are
computed for each training data set. Then we compare the
dispersion measures with a threshold Th. For each dispersion
measure, if its value is larger than Th and the corresponding
data set is injected deviation before, Nuu increases by 1. After
all the comparisons, TPR is calculated as Nuu2000 . If TPR ≥
95%, the threshold value is selected, otherwise we decrease
the value of Th and repeat the comparisons. The selected
threshold values under three different deviation measurements
are shown in Table I. From the Table I, it could be shown that
a smaller threshold could help to detect a tinier data deviation.
Thus, if the requirement for data accuracy is very high, a small
threshold should be selected.
Testing Phase In this phase, the second half of data samples
in the 100.dat file is chosen as the testing samples. For
simplicity, we assume the system could tolerate 5% data
deviation brought by faulty sensors. Then the testing samples
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Fig. 3. Capacity of proposed scheme
TABLE I
SELECTED THRESHOLD VALUES
α2 1% 5% 10%
Th 3.8 × 104 107 1.5 × 108
and the previously selected threshold 107 are utilized to
evaluate the TPR and FPR the proposed scheme could achieve
with different data set sizes and under different data deviations
which are higher than or less than 5%. In specific, for a certain
data set size N and deviation measurement α2, we select 10000
testing data sets each of which contains N data samples from
a continuous time period. Similar as the previous phase, 2000
data sets are randomly chosen from the testing data sets and
injected deviations. Then we compare the dispersion measures
with the selected threshold Th. If a dispersion measure is larger
than Th and the corresponding data set is injected deviation
before, Nuu increases by 1, otherwise Nnu increases by 1.
Finally, the TPR is calculated as Nuu2000 and FPR is calculated
as Nnu8000 . The simulation results with different α
2 and N are
show in Table II. According to Table II, it could be shown
that when the deviation measurement is higher than 5%, the
proposed scheme could always achieve a TPR higher than 95%
with the preset threshold while maintaining a relatively small
FPR. Moreover, collecting more data samples for detection
normally could achieve a higher TPR while bringing a larger
FPR as the price.
According to the above analysis, it is shown that with a
proper threshold selected based on the maximum allowed data
deviation, the proposed scheme could achieve a high TPR
and keep the FPR relatively small. In addition, the proposed
scheme is also very flexible, i.e. when there are spare resource,
the proposed scheme could collect more data samples for
analysis to achieve a higher TPR.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF PROPOSED SCHEME
Th = 107
α2
N
10 15 20 25
4% TPR 0.8115 0.9175 0.9610 0.9850
FPR 0.0808 0.1041 0.1190 0.1432
4.5% TPR 0.9240 0.9740 0.9895 0.9940
FPR 0.0843 0.1046 0.1149 0.1420
5% TPR 0.9560 0.9875 0.9950 0.9970
FPR 0.0815 0.1051 0.1154 0.1409
5.5% TPR 0.9815 0.9935 0.9955 0.9945
FPR 0.0818 0.1043 0.1189 0.1426
6% TPR 0.9865 0.9950 0.9950 0.9970
FPR 0.0811 0.1029 0.1177 0.1411
C. Computation Complexity
In the proposed detection scheme, when SS generates an
encrypted and signed data sample Ci | |SS | |TSi | |σi , it needs to
perform 2 exponentiation operation in Zn2 to produce Ci , and
1 multiplication operation in G to generate σi . Upon receiving
N data samples from SS, FD needs (N +1) pairing operations
for signature verification. During the fog aggregation, the cost
for aggregating Ci as C is negligible since the multiplication
in Zn2 is considered as negligible compared to exponentiation
and pairing operations. Note that the Ca = g
∑l
i=1 ai ·d mod n2
could be calculated in advance and utilized repeatedly, so the
cost for generating Ca could be ignored. To calculate CDi
and aggregate CDi as Rf , FD requires 2N exponentiation
operations in Zn2 . Additionally, 1 multiplication operation in
G is required for FD to generate the signature for aggregation
result. As for SD, it has to perform 2 pairing operations
every time it receives an aggregation result from FD. After
verification, SD needs to perform 1 exponentiation operation
in Zn2 to decrypt the aggregation result. Obtaining the plaintext
of aggregation result, the calculating of scatter matrix and
9dispersion measure would be performed on plaintext, of which
computation cost is negligible compared to other operations.
Finally, to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of its report,
SD would further perform 1 multiplication operation in G to
generate the signature. Upon receiving the report from SD, CC
needs to perform 1 pairing operation to verify the signature.
Let Ce, Cm and Cp denote the resource consumptions of an
exponentiation operation in Zn2 , a multiplication operation in
G and a pairing operation respectively. To determine whether
SS is faulty, the total required computation resource for SS,
FD, SD and CC will be N(2Ce+Cm), [(N+1)Cp+2NCe+Cm],
(2Cp +Ce +Cm) and Cp respectively in the proposed scheme.
It could be seen that most of the computation resource is
consumed in fog devices rather than CC which means the fog
devices ease the computation burden of CC through processing
data locally.
D. Communication Overhead
In this part, the consumption of communication resource
from local region to CC is evaluated. For the comparison
with the proposed fog-assisted scheme, we consider the tra-
ditional approach (denoted by TRAD). In TRAD approach,
SS encrypts its data sample with AES-128 technique as
Ci = EAES(d1i | | · · · | |dli) and generates the signature as in the
proposed scheme. Then SS sends the encrypted and signed
data to FD. Upon receiving N data sample from SS, FD
performs batch verification to verify their signatures. Then
FD concatenates the N samples as C1 | | · · · | |CN and generates
a signature for it. After that, FD sends the concatenated
message and signature to SD. Since the concatenated message
contains the sensor data, SD would not be granted the ability
to decrypt it. Therefore, SD relays the message directly to CC.
After decrypting the message, CC would utilize the traditional
methods mentioned in Section I to determine whether SS is
faulty. For the encryption in TRAD, we assume one AES-128
block is enough to encapsulate the l-dimensional data. For the
signature generation, we assume a 160-bits G are chosen.
In TRAD approach, since FD concatenates N data samples
and SD just relays the message, the size of concatenated
message sent to CC is STRAD = (N · 128 + |SS | + |TS | + 160)
bits. In the proposed scheme, since SD is able to perform the
detection locally, the size of data sent to CC is Sproposed =
(|report | + |SD | + |TS | + 160) bits . We plot the communi-
cation overhead of both schemes in terms of N , as shown
in Fig. 4, where we assume the (|SS | + |TS |) are 50 bits
and (|report | + |SD| + |TS |) are 60 bits. It is shown that the
proposed scheme exceeds the TRAD approach in terms of the
communication resource consumption. With the increasing of
N , the advantage of our scheme becomes more significant.
Note that just for one smart sensor, the proposed scheme
could reduce that much communication cost. Considering the
huge amount of sensors spread in IoT, the total communication
bandwidth saved by the proposed scheme would be substantial.
From the above analysis, the proposed detection scheme
manages to relieve the communication load of CC remarkably
with the assistance of fog computing, which would contribute
to realizing the future IoT.
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VII. RELATED WORKS
In this section, the previous research works related to this
paper are reviewed.
Faulty Sensor Detection Schemes Chen et al. [5] proposed
a distributed fault detection scheme based on majority voting
for WSN. Their scheme compares the measurement of the
sensor with that of its neighbours at time t. If the measurement
difference is higher than a threshold, the scheme compares
the measurement difference at time t with that at time t − 1.
If more than half of the neighbours have a considerably
different value and the measurement differences change over
the time greatly, the sensor is determined as faulty. Their
simulation results demonstrate that almost all the sensors could
be diagnosed correctly with large network size. They also
claim that in realistic situation, not enough neighbours would
cause the incorrect diagnosis. Lee et al. [6] proposed another
distributed faulty sensor detection scheme which considers
the time delay when comparing the sensor reading with its
neighbours. They employ a sliding window to eliminate the
impact of transmission delay. The simulation shows that their
scheme could identify the faults with high accuracy. Since their
scheme is also based on majority voting, they claim that the
existence of malicious nodes may compromise the detection
results. These distributed schemes are all designed for WSN
environment and could efficiently detect the sensor faults to
guarantee the overall system performance. However, in many
IoT applications, the number of sensors performing the same
task are usually limited. Even to guarantee the reliability,
the system may just deploy 2 or 3 sensors for the same
object. Therefore, the majority voting based mechanisms are
not feasible for general IoT scenarios. The proposed detection
scheme of this paper only analyzes the data from the single
sensor to be detected, which is suitable for the general IoT
applications.
Mehranbod et al. [7] proposed a bayesian belief network
based sensor fault detection scheme. The scheme is designed
for the scenario in which one node (parent node) has causal
influence on the other (child node). The correlation between
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the parent and child node is represented by the conditional
probability and the probability absolute difference is the mea-
surement used to detect faults. Warriach et al. [8] proposed
a machine learning based approach to detect sensor faults in
WSN. The hidden markov models is adopted to capture the
dynamics of a fault-free environment and dynamics of faulty
data. Then the structural analysis of the models is performed
to detect the sensor measurement faults. Yang et al. [9]
proposed a multi-level wavelet Shannon entropy based scheme
to locate the single-sensor fault. The scheme firstly chooses
the appropriate wavelet base for signal analysis according to
the criterion of maximum energy-to-Shannon entropy ratio.
Then the sensor fault is located based on the wavelet time
Shannon entropy and wavelet time-energy Shannon entropy.
Dunia et al. [10] proposed a faulty sensor identification scheme
utilizing the principal component analysis. The scheme uses
the principal component model to capture the measurement
correlations and reconstruct each variable. Then the status of
each sensor is identified based on a proposed sensor validity
index. All the above methods require a control center to
analyse the plaintext of the sensor data, which would consume
a large amount of communication resource of core networks.
The fog-assisted faulty sensor detection scheme proposed in
this paper is capable of detecting the faulty sensor locally and
thus conserve the network resource.
Fog Computing Applications The fog computing has at-
tracted more and more attentions recently. Cao et al. [26]
proposed a real-time fall detection system utilizing fog com-
puting. The detection task is split between the fog devices
and the server in their system to automatically detect the falls
in a timely manner. Dubey et al. [27] proposed a service-
oriented architecture for fog computing in telehealth applica-
tions. The low power embedded computers in the architecture
carry out data analytics on collected raw data and transmit
unique patterns to server. Their implementation shows that
the data volume transmitted to server is reduced and hence
saving the transmission power. Aazam et al. [28] presented
the architecture of smart gateway with fog computing in
which the data is pre-processed and trimmed before sending to
server. The network delay could be reduced by applying their
architecture. Truong et al. [29] proposed a new vehicular ad
hoc network architecture which combines the software defined
network and fog computing. Utilizing fog computing to offer
delay-sensitive and location-awareness services could optimize
the resources utility and reduce service latency. Zhu et al. [30]
proposed a web optimization mechanism in the context of fog
computing. In their mechanism, the existing methods for web
optimization are combined with the unique knowledge that is
only possessed at the fog nodes. The evaluation shows that
the web page rendering performance is improved comparing
to simply applying the existing methods. Deng et al. [31] in-
vestigated the tradeoff between transmission delay and power
consumption in the fog-cloud computing system. A workload
allocation problem targeting the minimal power consumption
with the constrained service delay is formulated. They solve
the problem with an approximate approach and the solution
could enable the fog computing save the communication band-
width of cloud and reduce transmission latency by sacrificing
modest computation resources. To the best of our knowledge,
the work proposed in this paper is the first attempt of taking
advantage of fog computing to detect faulty sensor in IoT.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, an efficient fog-assisted faulty sensor detection
scheme with privacy preserving in IoT has been proposed.
With the help of fog computing, the faulty sensors could be
detected locally and thus saving the communication and com-
putation resource of control center. The Paillier Cryptosystem
ensures the sensor data privacy is preserved during the fog ag-
gregation performed by the first layer fog devices. The second
layer fog devices could calculate the dispersion measure of
smart sensors based on the aggregation results efficiently. The
performance analyses have shown that the proposed scheme
can achieve a remarkable detection effectiveness and substan-
tially save the computation and communication overhead of
control center. The security analysis demonstrates the proposed
scheme could achieve authenticity, data integrity and privacy-
preservation at the same time. The eavesdropping, man-in-
the-middle attack and replay attack from adversary could be
completely prevented. In the future, we will investigate other
detection schemes for different sensor fault types.
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